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MOOREAN ABSURDITIES AND THE NATURE OF ASSERTION 
John N. Williams 
I. The Problem 
Over fifty years ago, G.E. Moore pointed out that to say, ' I  went to the pictures last 
Tuesday but I don' t  believe that I did' [11, p. 543] or ' I  believe that he has gone out, but 
he has not' [12, p. 204] would be 'absurd' [11, p. 543; 12, p. 204]. The importance of 
this discovery of a class of possibly true yet absurd assertions was first recognised by 
Wittgenstein, who once said that it was the only work of Moore 's  that greatly impressed 
him [9, p. 56]. 
Moore 's  own account of the absurdity, that my assertion that p ' implies'  my lack of 
belief that not-p [12, p. 204], was the starting point for early explanations, notably: that 
Moorean propositions are falsified by their own utterance [3, pp. 85-87]; that they can- 
not be asserted [2, pp. 28-31; 10, pp. 215-218]; that they are always pointless utterances 
[28, pp. 24-25]; that they cannot be believed [6, p. 67]; and that they cannot be used to 
express a be l ie f  [32, p. 119]. Recent explanat ions include Sorensen 's  claim that 
Moorean sentences are particular kinds of 'blindspots' ,  namely possible truths on which 
certain epistemic attitudes cannot (given background constraints) get a grip [15, pp. 52- 
53], an important consequence of which is that truth cannot be explained in terms of 
belief. A completely different approach is current in rival explanations of the absurdity 
in terms of self-defeating intentions on the part of the speaker [1, p. 228; 7, p. 185; 20, 
pp. 237-238]. Wittgenstein's account, that a statement of belief that p is itself a kind of 
assertion that p [29, § 478; 31, p. 177], has been lately defended by Linville and Ring [8, 
p. 296], Heal [5, p. 21] and recently modified by Goldstein [4, pp. 94-95]. 
This diversity of explanations, as well as their vulnerability to criticism (see [15, ch. 
1] and [24, pp. 38-46]), shows that the topic deserves respect if only because of its recal- 
citrance. A major fault of most of the early explanations is that they fail to recognise that 
Moore 's  examples typify two different forms of Moorean propositions, namely (a) 'p 
and I don't  believe that p'  and (b) 'p and I believe that not-p' (first recognised in my [21, 
pp. 141-142]). A second continuing fault is the failure to recognise that the absurdity of 
Moorean belief needs to be explained, as well as the absurdity of Moorean assertion. 
Wittgenstein correctly attributes the importance of Moorean propositions to the fact 
that the absurdity is 'similar to a contradiction, though it isn't  one' and credits Moore 
with having 'said something about the logic of assertion' [31, p. 177]. The study of the 
particular 'nonsense' involved in Moorean assertion can shed light on the difficult idea 
of assertion itself. 
I recently argued (in [27, pp. 160-166]) that the absurdity of assertions of the forms 
(a) and (b) cannot be explained in terms of the speaker's intentions, because there is no 
intentional structure common to all types of assertion. For example, my intention may 
be to let you know or make you believe what I say, or let you know or make you believe 
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136 Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion 
that I believe or know it. Such differences are partly reflected in descriptions of my 
assertion as informing or misinforming, lying or avowing. 
By contrast, there is a feature shared by any describable type of hearing (whether 
ignoring, overhearing, listening to, or eavesdropping on what I say): in all cases, the 
assertor offers the hearer (and affords secondary eavesdroppers) the prima facie justifica- 
tion to believe him, in other words, to believe that he is sincerely telling the truth. The 
offer turns out to be worthless when the assertion is Moorean. Just as Moorean proposi- 
tions cannot be rationally believed, so their assertors cannot be rationally believed or 
cannot be believed to be rational. 
I will now develop this analysis and extend it from Moore's propositions to Moorean 
propositions such as God knows I am an atheist or I believe that this proposition is false, 
in order to show that any proposition correctly defined as Moorean is absurd in one of 
two different but related ways, as exhibited by the paradigm cases of (a) and (19). This 
extended analysis also explains why Moorean sentences can sometimes be used without 
absurdity. Having thus examined what goes wrong and what goes right in assertion, I 
will defend an account of assertion itself. 
II. The Absurdities Of Moore's Propositions 
There can be cases in which I insincerely (untruthfully) tell the truth. I might pretend to 
let you know something which in fact is just a lucky guess. My attempt to deceive you 
with a lie may be defeated by the fact that my belief in the falsehood of my assertion is 
mistaken. But unless you recognise such rare cases for what they are, your justification 
for thinking that I 'm telling the truth, includes the justification for thinking me sincere. 
So in asserting that p, I normally express a belief that p in the sense that I afford you 
the prima facie justification for thinking me sincere, by affording you the prima facie 
justification for thinking me a truth-teller. 
What justifies this ascription of truth? Not Moore's claim [11, pp. 542-543] that 
lying is vastly exceptional, nor against my strengthened version of it [27, p. 164] that 
insincerity and falsehood are necessarily exceptional, both of which invite challenge by 
sceptical brains-in-vats or evil demon scenarios. 1 Nonetheless, the rational thing to do is 
to take appearances at face-value, unless keen observation indicates otherwise. So what 
entitles you to take me as sincere and truthful is the experientially undefeated presump- 
tion that insincerity and falsehood are exceptional. When asking for directions in a 
strange town, it is a better bet to err on the side of gullibility than paranoia, even if (for 
once) the paranoid prejudice is correct and all the natives are out to get you. Note that 
this account allows for lying assertions, since a successful liar expresses a belief that he 
doesn't have. 
So when I assert that p, I express a belief that p. I also assert (in (a)) a lack of belief 
that p or (in (b)) a belief that not-p. So the conjunction of what I assert and what I 
express is a logical impossibility in (a) and contradictory beliefs in (b). This is precisely 
what you must believe if you believe me - a logical impossibility or that I have contra- 
dictory beliefs. 
I owe this point to Roy Sorensen. 
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By making an assertion I offer you the justification to believe me, in other words, to 
believe that I am sincerely telling the truth. The sincerity condition is needed, since if 
you know that I am inadvertently telling the truth in a failed attempt to deceive you, you 
will believe what I say, but you won' t  believe me. But when the assertion is Moorean, 
the offer is worthless. In fact it provides a justification for not believing me (in the case 
of (a)) or for not believing me on the charitable assumption that I am minimally rational 
in not holding contradictory beliefs (in the case of (b)). To see this, suppose that you do 
believe me. Since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I 
believe thatp. And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you believe that 
I don't believe thatp (in (a)) and you believe that I believe that not-p (in (b)). If you are 
to believe me, you must have contradictory beliefs in the first case (conclusive grounds 
for disbelieving me, which will therefore force any rational person to withhold belief), 
and you must think I have them in the second (conclusive grounds for believing me irra- 
tional). So you cannot believe me unless you are irrational or judge me to be so. 
But there is more to Moore 's  absurdities than absurd assertion, since (a) and (b) 
remain absurd if I do not assert, but merely believe them. Indeed, the belief is intuitively 
more absurd than the assertion. Such a believer is irrational because his belief (as 
opposed to what he believes) is necessarily false or entails contradictory beliefs (and not 
as I claimed in [27, p. 165] because he has inconsistent ones, as I argue in §V). On a 
highly plausible 'conjunction principle' that believing a conjunction entails believing its 
conjuncts, if I believe (a), then I believe that p. But then (a) is false, since its second con- 
junct is false. It is therefore a mistake to think that because the content of a belief could 
be true, it would be possible to believe-it-correctly. For (a) is a possible truth about me 
and can be believed by me, but it cannot be true of me i f  it is believed by me. By con- 
trast, I can correctly believe (b), 2 since my belief that p is consistent with its second 
conjunct if I hold contradictory beliefs, one of which must therefore be incorrect. 
Alternatively put, my believing either (a) or (b), entails (by applying the conjunction 
principle to its first conjunct) that I believe that p. But the correctness of what I believe 
entails that I don't believe thatp, in (a), or that 1 believe that not-p, in (b). So my believ- 
ing-correctly entails a contradiction (in the case of (a)) and contradictory beliefs (in the 
case of (b)), although (a) and (b) themselves might be true, and might be believed. 
Thus the explanation of  the absurdity is that a Moorean assertor either cannot be 
rationally believed, or cannot be believed to be rational; and a Moorean believer is irra- 
tional either because his belief cannot be correct, or because it entails contradictory 
beliefs. We also have a desirable fit between the explanations of Moorean belief and of 
Moorean assertion, since the contradiction-like phenomena entailed by Moorean correct- 
ly-believing is identical to that entailed by believing Moorean assertors. 
III. Moorean Propositions 
Consider the following propositions which intuitively display the paradigmatic oddity of 
Moore's examples (cf. [15, pp. 17, 45]). Their labels denote their types: 
I avoid the expression, 'true belief' which is doubly ambiguous between a belief in something 
true and a belief that is sincerely professed or, more dangerously, a true ascription of belief. So 
'correct belief' is true belief in the first sense. 
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138 Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion 
(lb) God knows that I am an atheist. 
(2a) God knows that I am a non-believer. 
(3a) Although you disagree with me about everything, you are always right. 
(4a) I have no beliefs now. 
(5b) Everything I believe is false. 
(6b) I believe that this proposition is false. 
Sorensen defines Moorean sentences as 'those which are vulnerable to belief-based criti- 
cism but are immune to direct criticism' [15, p. 39]. The speaker cannot be criticised in 
terms of a direct appeal to what  he says, but can be criticised rather on the assumption 
that he believes what he says. This is essentially correct, but to avoid restricting the defi- 
nition to sentences and hence to assertion, I prefer to rephrase it as: 
(MP) Any proposition is Moorean iff it is consistent and any assertor of it can be jus- 
tifiably criticised as irrational, but only on the assumption that he believes it. 
The first condition is pretty obvious. Although they sound like self-contradictions, 
Moore's propositions are possible truths. In fact the first condition is subsumed by the 
second, for if a proposition is inconsistent then its assertor or believer can be directly 
criticised solely in terms of it. Thus, for example, 
Although we disagree about everything, we are always right 
is non-Moorean, because it is inconsistent. 
On this definition, an assertor need not believe what he asserts in order for him to be 
justifiably criticised as irrational. The criticism is justified, because a critic is justified in 
thinking (rightly or wrongly) that this is what the assertor believes. This explains why 
Moorean assertion seems less absurd than Moorean belief. A Moorean assertor express- 
es Moorean beliefs, which are conclusive signs of irrationality. But a Moorean assertor 
can express Moorean beliefs which in fact he doesn't have, and it is arguably a lesser sin 
to license the criticism of irrationality than to be guilty of it. 
The definition accounts for the fact that not every way of thinking Moore's proposi- 
tions is absurd, as Wittgenstein recognised. In [30, § 280, his italics] he asks: 
But what does this mean: ' I t ' s  raining and I don't believe it' makes sense if I mean it 
as a hypothesis, and does not make sense if I mean it as an assertion, or a report? 
Neither (a) nor (b) is an absurd thing to suppose. That I fail to believe a particular truth, 
or that a particular belief of mine is false, are both perfectly rational suppositions. This 
explains why Moorean propositions can be the antecedents of non-Moorean subjunctive 
conditionals such as 
(SCa) If I were to fail to believe the truth that it 's raining, then I would be surprised 
to discover that the streets are wet 
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John N. Williams 139 
and 
(SCb) If I were incorrectly to believe that i t 's  not raining, then I would be (even 
more) surprised to discover that the streets are wet 
because their antecedents are supposed, not asserted. One important negative conse- 
quence of their non-absurdity is the inapplicability of Stalnaker's Ramseyan test [16, p. 
102] for the truth of subjunctive conditionals: 
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make 
Whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency . . . finally consider 
whether or not the consequent is then true. 
The problem is that although I can suppose that a Moorean antecedent is true, I cannot 
sensibly believe it or even sensibly suppose that I believe it. To suppose that I believe it 
is to suppose that I have a belief which is necessarily incorrect or which entails contra- 
dictory beliefs,  which I will  therefore abandon in order to maintain consistency. 
Nonetheless, (SCa) and (SCb) report possible truths which I could sensibly believe. So 
although it is absurd to think that Moore's propositions are true, thoughts of them are not 
necessarily absurd. 
The definition also correctly excludes propositions that are straightforwardly odd or 
absurd in themselves. As Sorensen argues, [15, pp. 26-27], 
I believe that it is raining and I believe that it is not 
is not Moorean. Other non-Moorean propositions include: 
I believe that it is both raining and not raining 
and 
It is raining but I have no reason at all for believing that it is. 
Although these would be consistent yet absurd assertions, in no case need we assume 
that an assertor believes his assertion in order to criticise him of irrationality, for he can 
be so criticised solely by appealing to the putative fact which is asserted. In each case he 
asserts something straightforwardly irrational about himself; that he holds contradictory 
beliefs or one which is self-contradictory, or that he holds a straightforwardly factual 3 
belief for no reason. 
To what kind of belief-based criticism, are Moorean proposit ions vulnerable? 
Sorensen's answer is that ' . . .  the Moorean speaker h a s . . ,  contradicted himself through 
a commitment to directly opposed beliefs' [15, p. 39]. This is where Sorensen goes 
wrong. A (b)-type assertor expresses a commitment to directly opposed beliefs. But an 
3 It might be argued that there is no irrationality in holding a groundless belief in, say, induction 
or the existence of other minds. 
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140 Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion 
(a)-type assertor expresses a commitment and the lack of  it to the same belief. The dif- 
ference is analogous to the difference between expressing an interest in two logically 
incompatible activities, as when I say, ' I 'd  really like to go out tonight but I 'd love to 
stay in'  and expressing an interest and a lack of it in the same activity, as when I say, ' I 'd  
really like to go out tonight but the prospect of going out leaves me cold'. And anyone 
who believes an (a)-type assertor, is committed to having 'opposed' or contradictory 
beliefs, as against being committed to ascribing them to a (b)-type assertor. 
Unlike Sorensen's, my analysis also explains the absurdity of Moorean propositions 
when they are unasserted but believed. But this requires the conjunction principle and 
Sorensen claims that any analysis of Moorean sentences should avoid commitments to 
doxastic logic [15, pp. 19-22] unless as a hypothetical test on which to base criticism [15, 
p. 43]. I agree that doxastic principles are generally dubious. Belief seems neither to 
collect nor distribute over disjunction. Nor does belief seem to collect over conjunction 
(see [22, pp. 600-601; 26, pp. 125-131]). However, my analysis does not need a full- 
b lown 'doxas t ic  logic ' ,  but  only the sole pr inciple  that be l ie f  distributes over 
conjunction. And although it may be reasonable to avoid the appeal to doxastic princi- 
ples when explaining Moorean assertion, it seems much less reasonable when explaining 
Moorean belief. It seems perfectly in order for an explanation to appeal to a true princi- 
ple which is about what it explains. 
Note that although this conjunction principle is a consequence of the principle that we 
always believe the entailments of what we believe, I reject [23, p. 85] the 'entailment 
principle', yet consistently accept the conjunction principle. Accepting it commits me 
merely to accepting the entailment principle in the special case in which the entailment is 
from a conjunction to its conjuncts. I admit that I can provide no reason for the conjunc- 
tion principle, possibly because its truth is so fundamental that no reason would be 
appropriate. Nonetheless, I accept it in the light of its plausibility and the absence of 
counter-examples. 
So any adequate analysis of Moorean absurdity must define Moorean propositions 
and explain the absurdity both of asserting and of believing them in a way that preserves 
the crucial difference in absurdity. Of course, the crucial difference between (a) and (b), 
which is disguised by Moore's examples, exists only if there is a difference between not 
believing that p and believing that not-p. That difference is now uncontroversial, but 
since I am unaware of any demonstration of it, a quick knock-down proof seems in 
order: 
If believing that not-p entailed a lack of belief that p then contradictory beliefs would 
be impossible (unwelcome for reasons given in [25, pp. 279-285; 15, p. 27]), since if I 
believe that p and believe that not-p, then it would follow that I believe and don't believe 
that p. And the converse entailment proscribes agnosticism, since if I neither believe that 
p nor believe that not-p, then it would follow that I believe and don't  believe that not-p. 
IV. Presupposition And Expressing Belief 
Take 
(lb) God knows that I am an atheist. 
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A difficult question now looms of the relation of ( lb)  to 
141 
(lb') God exists. 
Russell, of course, held that the correct analysis of a statement whose grammatical sub- 
ject is a definite description, such as, 
(S) The king of France is bald 
includes the statement that there exists one thing which fits the description [13, p. 490]. 
So, for Russell, (S) entails 
(P) The king of France exists 4 
and asserting (S) entails asserting (P). Similarly, since the grammatical subject of (lb) is 
an ordinary proper name, which is itself a disguised description, (lb) entails (lb') and 
asserting (lb) entails asserting (lb'). Strawson famously denies this [17, p. 331]. Rather, 
an assertion of (S) implies [17, p. 330] or presupposes [18, p. 216] (P), in the sense that 
the presupposing statement lacks a truth-value if its presupposition is false. Sellars 
denies this, but claims that I can correctly assert such a statement only if I believe both 
that its presupposition is true and that my hearer believes it too. And I can only correctly 
assert that the presupposing statement is true or false if I believe its presupposition [14, 
p. 206]. Presumably Sellars agrees with Russell that (S) is false given that (P) is false, 
but thinks it would be misleading to say so. In his reply to Sellars, Strawson claims that 
one can correctly and sincerely assert (S) iff one believes that the conditions for the truth 
of (S), (including the truth of (P)) obtain [19, p. 217]. A possible case now arises in 
which I assert (S) with the intention of deceiving you into believing (P). In order to 
avoid the consequence that such lies are never falsehoods, Strawson adds the caveat that 
in such cases I may be said to have made a false statement [19, p. 225]. 
Fortunately, I do not have to take sides here. A consequence of all three theories is 
that an assertion is expressive of belief in its presuppositions. 
On Russell's theory, if I assert (S) then I assert (P). Since assertion is expressive of 
belief, I express a belief in (P), in asserting (S). On Strawson's qualified theory, if I sin- 
cerely assert (S) then I believe (P) and it follows from this that if I believe (S) then I 
believe (P), i.e.: 
(PS Bel) If p presupposes q then it is impossible to believe p without believing that q. 
In his early theory [17, p. 332] Strawson points out that if you are justified in thinking 
that I am correctly using the expression which is the subject term of my assertion that (S) 
- which of course you normally are - then you are justified in thinking that I believe that 
the subject term has a genuine reference. In short, you are justified in thinking that I 
believe (P). Sellars' claim that I can 'correctly assert' something only if I believe both 
Russell would not put it like this, since the analysis aims at eliminating the definite article, but 
the entailment is nonetheless a consequence of the analysis. 
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 O
f 
We
st
er
n 
Au
st
ra
li
a]
 A
t:
 0
8:
38
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
08
142 Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion 
that its presupposition is true and that my hearer believes it too, seems to stand or fall 
with the plausible claim that you can justifiably think that my assertion is 'correct' (pre- 
sumably not a misuse of language or a piece of deceit) only if you think I believe its 
presupposition. It follows that if you are justified in thinking that I am not deceitful and 
know what I am saying, then you are justified in ascribing the belief in the presupposi- 
tion to me. So it follows that: 
(psExp) If p presupposes q then it is impossible to express a belief that p without 
expressing a belief that q. 
(psBel), itself a plausible condition of presupposition, entails (psExp). For if  I can't  
believe that p without believing that q, then your justification for thinking that I believe 
that p, includes the justification for thinking that I believe that q. 
So by (psExp), in asserting that 
(lb) God knows that I am an atheist 
I express the belief that God exists. But if what I assert is true then I believe God does 
not exist. If you believe me then you believe (lb) and you believe that I believe (lb). If 
your first belief is correct then I believe that God does not exist (because I am indeed an 
atheist if  God knows that I 'm one). And if your second belief is correct then by (psBel), 
I believe that God does exist. So if you believe me then you are justified in ascribing 
contradictory beliefs to me. If I believe (lb), then, if my belief is correct, I believe that 
God does not exist. But then, by (pSBel), I also believe that God does exist. My belief in 
(lb) can be correct, but only at the price of contradictory beliefs. 
Compare (lb) with: 
(2a) God knows that I am a non-believer. 
By (psExp), in asserting this, I express the belief that God exists. But if  what I assert is 
true then I don't believe that God exists. If you believe me then you believe (2a) and you 
believe that I believe (2a). If your first belief is correct then I don't believe that God 
exists. And if your second belief is correct then, by (psBel), I do believe that God exists. 
So if you believe me then you have contradictory beliefs. If  I believe (2a) then by 
(psBel), I believe that God exists, but then (2a) is false. So I can't correctly believe it. 
Of course, the difference between ( lb)  and (2a) is unsurprising. The difference 
between atheists and non-believers is precisely the difference between the external and 
the internal negation of a belief that God exists. Of more interest is the fact that any 
atheist who does not hold contradictory beliefs about the existence of God is a non- 
believer. So if I assert (lb), then if you take me to be minimally rational, you must take 
me to assert (2a) as well. But, as we have seen, this means that you cannot believe me 
unless you believe me to be irrational. And if you believe me when I assert that 
God knows that we are atheists 
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 O
f 
We
st
er
n 
Au
st
ra
li
a]
 A
t:
 0
8:
38
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
08
John N. Williams 
then the irrationality spreads to include us both. 
dictory beliefs which you must ascribe to me. 
143 
For then you have the same contra- 
V. Self-Referential Moorean Propositions 
Consider 
(3a) Although you disagree with me about everything, you are always right. 
If I assert this then I express a belief in it. But if the belief expressed is correct, then you 
rightly disagree with me about (3a), so (3a) is false. So, my assertion that (3a) is true, 
contradicts the belief that the assertion itself expresses. If you believe me when I assert 
it then you believe that (3a) is true. But if your belief is correct and (3a) is true then you 
believe that it is false (because you disagree with it). So the only way your belief can be 
correct is if  you hold contradictory beliefs about the truth-value of (3a). At this point 
Moorean assertion (on the part of the speaker) and Moorean belief (on the part of the 
hearer) merge. If you believe me when I make this Moorean assertion then you are a 
Moorean believer. If you are rational, you can't believe me. 
Given that you believe me, it also follows that you believe that I believe that (3a) is 
true. But if I do believe that it is true then I am correct in this belief only if (3a) is false 
(because then your disagreement with it is right). So if you believe me then the belief 
you must ascribe to me cannot be correct. In other words, if you believe me then you 
think that I am a Moorean believer. If you believe me then you should judge me to be 
irrational. 
This shows that self-reference is the key to the absurdity of (3a). No absurdity arises 
if a particularly Confucian son believes of, or asserts to, his father, 'Although you have 
disagreed with me on everything, you are always right', thus excluding his present asser- 
tion from its sphere of reference. 
In fact there is a sub-family of Moorean propositions which refer, at least in part, to 
the beliefs in those propositions. Examples include 
(4a) I have no beliefs now 
and 
(5b) Everything I believe is false 
as well as doxastic variants of Liar-type propositions such as 
(6b) I believe that this proposition is false. 
This sub-family can be defined as follows: 
(SR) Any proposition is self-referentially Moorean iff it is Moorean and it refers, at 
least in part, to the belief that any assertor of it would have were he to believe 
it. 
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I do not want to include Liar-type propositions like 
(L) This proposition is false 
in this sub-family, since it is at least arguable that they are inconsistent and hence not 
Moorean. Consider 
(4a) I have no beliefs now. 
If I assert it then I express a belief in it and so conjointly express and assert a logical 
impossibility. And if you now believe me then you believe that I have no beliefs now 
and you believe that I now believe that I have no beliefs now. So if you believe me then 
you have contradictory beliefs. 
The other (b)-type self-referential Moorean proposition is exemplified by 
(5b) Everything I believe is false. 
If my assertion of this is true then the belief I express is incorrect. If you believe me then 
you believe that (i) everything I believe is false, and you believe that (ii) I believe that 
everything I believe is false. But if (i) is true, then given that (ii) is true as well, it fol- 
lows that (i) is false after all. So your beliefs contradict each other. 
Some sentences can be read in two ways, only one of which is self-referentially 
Moorean. For example, the ambiguous reference of the demonstrative in 
(6b) I believe that this proposition is false 
makes it ambiguous between 
(6b') t believe that (6b') is false 
and 
(6b") I believe that (L) is true. 
Given that (L) is inconsistent, (6b") is absurd in itself, so a person who asserts it can be 
criticised on the basis of it alone. We need not assume that he believes it to make this 
criticism, so it is non-Moorean. Let us then take (6b) as (6b'). Suppose that I believe it, 
in other words, I believe that (6b') is true. If my belief is correct then (6b') is true, in 
which case I believe that it is false. So I have contradictory beliefs. And if I assert (6b'), 
I express a belief that it is true. But what I assert (as we have already seen) entails that I 
believe that it is false. So my assertion and resulting expression of belief commits me to 
contradictory beliefs. If  you believe me then (i) you believe that (6b') is true. And if this 
belief is correct then, as we have just seen, I believe that (6b') is false. So if you believe 
me, rationality demands that you ascribe contradictory beliefs to me. Alternatively, if 
you believe me then (ii) you believe that I believe that (6b') is true. But an equivalent 
description of your belief as reported by (i), is that you believe that I believe that (6b') is 
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false. So again, if you believe me you must ascribe contradictory beliefs to me. 
Not all doxastically self-referring propositions are Moorean. Consider a proposition 
which corresponds to the preface paradox, 
(PP) I have at least one false belief. 
(PP) is not Moorean. Asserting or believing it is a perfectly rational recognition of falli- 
bility, which is likely to be true of any human being. And if I do assert my fallibility, 
you would be perfectly reasonable to believe me. Admittedly, believing it ensures that it 
is true, and thus ensures my fallibility. For if  I do believe it, its falsehood ensures its 
truth. If it is false that even one of my beliefs, including my belief in (PP), is false, then 
none of my beliefs are false. So all of my beliefs, including my belief in (PP), are true, 
which contradicts (PP) itself. So (PP) must be true if I believe it. It follows that I now 
have inconsistent beliefs. What does not follow is that I have contradictory beliefs. My 
belief in (PP) is not self-contradictory, since its truth does not entail its falsehood. Nor 
does this belief entail beliefs which contradict each other, since we may suppose that 
none of my beliefs includes the belief that all of my beliefs are true. Therefore believing 
(PP) is not enough to make me a Moorean believer, since (as I argued in [22, pp. 600- 
602; 26, pp. 121-140]) inconsistent beliefs can sometimes be held rationally, as opposed 
to contradictory or self-contradictory ones. The minimal condition of rationality is the 
absence of contradictory beliefs, which, given the conjunction principle, includes the 
absence of self-contradictory ones. But the condition does not include the absence of 
inconsistent beliefs. Admittedly, a generalisation of the preface paradox arises if we 
supplement (PP) with the claim that all my beliefs are rational (for then I appear to have 
inconsistent beliefs each of which is rational). But whatever the solution is to the para- 
dox (arguably that there is no paradox at all), it is not that the author's disclaimer in the 
preface is irrational, let alone Moorean. 
VI. The Disappearance Of Absurdity 
Any adequate analysis of Moorean propositions must answer the following question: 
why are there circumstances in which Moorean sentences can be uttered without absurdi- 
ty? A virtue of  O.R. Jones '  account of Moore ' s  propositions (that asserting them 
frustrates an intention to impart knowledge) is that it attempts to answer this question. 
Jones gives two cases, one of the fundamentalist who declares in a theological examina- 
tion, 'The story of Jonah and the whale is only an al legory'  and another of a quiz 
contestant who intends her guess to be understood as such [7, p. 186]. No absurdity aris- 
es in either case, if the person adds, 'but I believe that it is not' ,  either as a salve to 
conscience or as a 'mere "spoilsport" signalling that that answer was a guess' [7, p. 186]. 
Wittgenstein considers a similar example, namely a railway announcer who, perhaps 
groundlessly, is convinced that the train won' t  arrive and who therefore announces on 
schedule, '"Train No . . . .  will arrive a t . . .  o'clock. Personally I don't believe it"' [29, § 
486]. 
Jones' second example is dubious. Although the contestant's guess does not defeat 
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an intention to impart knowledge, isn't there still something absurd about it? If the con- 
testant really believes that her answer is wrong, surely it is silly of her to choose it as a 
guess. It might be counterargued that any guess which she might make, is likewise 
believed by her to be wrong, so her actual guess cannot be put in a worse light, since all 
possible guesses are on a par. Whichever position is right, the reasonableness of the 
guess is not clear-cut. Had Jones focused less on (b)-type Moorean propositions, he 
might have side-stepped this doubt by making an (a)-type contestant add, 'but I don't  
believe it ', for then the accusation of silliness cannot be made. 
My account easily explains the non-absurdity of such cases. In each, the speaker fails 
to express a belief needed to generate the absurdity. We are not justified in thinking that 
the fundamentalist believes that the story of Jonah is allegorical, given that we know that 
he is salving his conscience, any more than we are justified in thinking that the contes- 
tant believes what we know to be a mere guess (in the sense that it is correct by accident, 
if at all). Similarly, no absurdity arises if we know that Wittgenstein's railway announc- 
er is just under orders to parrot what is written in front of him, for then we are not 
justified in thinking him sincere. 
A rather different case arises when, unsurprised at the familiar sight of a notoriously 
heavy drinker heading for the bar yet again, I attempt humour with the remark, 'He ' s  
ordering more beer, I don't  believe it!'. Here the second part of the remark fails to justi- 
fy judgement that I 'm telling the (literal) truth. In the context of heavy irony I do not 
offer my fellow drinkers the justification for thinking that I lack the belief that he is 
ordering more beer. 
Finally, suppose that we both overhear someone say of the heavy drinker, 'He 's  given 
up drinking for good this time' and I comment sarcastically, 'Oh yes, he 's  given up 
drinking, I don't  think'. The first part of my comment doesn't justify judgements that 
I 'm sincere or telling the literal truth. In fact it isn't a literal assertion at all, but rather 
the mentioning of someone else's assertion in order to assert its negation. None of the 
grammatically Moorean utterances in which the absurdity disappears, are genuine asser- 
tions, as I explain in the next section. 
VII. Expression Of Belief, Intention And The Nature Of Assertion 
Asserting that p is not the only way of expressing belief that p. A more direct way for me 
to express the belief that p is simply to assert that I hold it. Here the justification to think 
that I am telling the truth is identical with the justification to think I 'm sincere. For if 
you are justified in thinking that q, where q is my assertion that I believe that p, then you 
are justified in thinking that I believe that p. I might also express this belief by substitut- 
ing my own name for the first-person pronoun. But then my assertion, 'Wil l iams 
believes that p ' ,  is not as clearly expressive of my belief that p, as my assertion, ' I  
believe that p' ,  because this third-person form of assertion leaves room for you to doubt 
that I am Williams or to doubt that I believe that I am Williams. Your degree of justifi- 
able doubt proportionally diminishes the degree to which you are justified in thinking 
that I believe that p. 
Some assertions are non-linguistic. If you scoff at my forecast of rain and I respond 
by picking up my umbrella and shaking it at you with a defiant grin on my face, it seems 
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correct to say that I asser ted  that it will rain and so expressed a belief that it will. 
I can intend to express a belief but fail, and I can express a belief without intending 
to. For example, if I attempt to inform you of something, or tell you a lie, I will normal- 
ly fail to express a belief ff I am too drunk to make the utterance intelligible. I try to 
express myself but fail, because I do not justify you in thinking that I have the relevant 
belief. I try to make an assertion but fail, because what I offer you is no justification at 
all. Conversely, I might express a belief that it will rain by carrying an umbrella (as 
opposed to shaking it defiantly). Carrying it is expressive of belief in the sense that it 
justifies an audience in thinking that I believe that it will rain. But I could not make an 
assertion if I had no  intention at  all  to do with the epistemology of a hearer, but was 
merely walking down the street with the umbrella, day-dreaming of sunny weather. By 
contrast, shaking the umbrella defiantly counts as an informing, misinforming, contend- 
ing or denying assertion, depending on how I intend to change your mind, even if the 
change is merely intended to be your recognition of mistaken belief in our divided opin- 
ion, as when I make an insincere avowal to 'wind you up'. 
So although there are different types of intentions in different types of assertion, there 
is always s o m e  intention or other to change the way the audience thinks. For example, I 
a v o w  to you that p iff I express the belief that p with the intention of making you think 
that I believe that p. I lie to you that p iff I express the belief that p (in the sense that I 
offer you the justification for thinking that I have a belief which in fact I don't) with the 
intention of making you believe incorrectly that p (in the sense of aiming to make you 
believe something in the knowledge or belief that it is false). And I inform you that p iff 
I express a belief that p with the successful intention of letting you know that p. So when 
I assert that p, I express a belief that p with the intention of causing epistemic change in 
the cognition of  my audience. The change I aim for is relevant to my assertion in the 
sense that the proposition which I assert forms the core of the description of the intended 
change in your knowledge or beliefs, as in making you believe that I believe that p, mak- 
ing you believe incorrectly that p or letting you know that p. In addition, I might intend 
the intended change to bring about further secondary cognitive changes, particularly 
emotive ones, which are not relevant in this sense to my assertion. For example, I might 
lie, or inform you, that my salary is greater than yours, as a warning, boast or insult. 
So assertion can be defined as follows: 
(A) Anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention 
of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential 
audience. 
This definition even accommodates the case of the man who repeatedly, sincerely and 
truthfully declares his innocence to interrogators who mistakenly try to extract a sincere 
confession from him. Even if he knows that the interrogators will never believe him, his 
declarations still count as assertions. The innocent man tries (perhaps irrationally) to 
make himself believed although he knows he will not, in fact, succeed. Promises are 
kinds of assertions, since my promise that I ' l l  be punctual aims to convince you that I 
will, by expressing my conviction or knowledge that I will. 
The definition also explains why assertions fail. The first kind of non-assertion lacks 
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both the expression of belief and the relevant intentions. A parrot which utters the truth, 
' I  can fly', neither expresses a belief nor has intentions to bring about relevant cognitive 
change. Similarly, the transparent and self-admitted guesses of a contestant in a quiz are 
not assertions, since they are neither expressions of belief, nor are they intended to con- 
vince his questioner that he knows the answer (as they would be in the case of a genuine 
examination). 
The second kind of non-assertion occurs when we have the right kind of intention 
without the expression of belief. An anonymous letter to an employer falsely accusing a 
colleague would contain an assertion, because it entitles a belief to be ascribed to the 
writer, but fabricating evidence in order to convince the authorities of his guilt, is decep- 
tion, but not a lie. My suggestion that you reconsider your verdict, is not an assertion, 
even if I aim to make you change your mind. Neither is an incantation designed to 
enchant you into thinking that I am omniscient. 
The third kind of non-assertion occurs when the expression of belief lacks the neces- 
sary intentions. Wearing a green tie on St. Patrick's Day as a convention to avow British 
tyranny is an assertion of my political beliefs, but muttering about the government in my 
sleep is not. 
Finally, the reference to a potential audience is needed to accommodate cases in 
which I wish to change the epistemic cognition of anyone who cares to take notice. If I 
wear a billboard proclaiming the end of the world, that would certainly be a (telling or 
avowing) assertion, even in an empty street. ~ 
National University of Singapore Received May 1994 
Revised November 1994 
My thanks to Roy Sorensen, Mark D'Cruz, Ram Prasad, Wayne Patterson, Tim Dore and the 
referees for this Journal for useful criticism of previous drafts. 
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